On the eve of the first year anniversary of the Arab uprisings, it is useful to reflect on the state of EU-Africa relations, particularly in the aftermath of the prominent role played by key EU member states in Libya. Under the weight of United Nations Security Resolution 1973, which validated an intervention led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Colonel Muammar Gaddafi met his death brutally on 20 October 2011 at the hands of his fellow citizens. This marked the end of Gaddafi's tempestuous relationship with the West, oscillating through various cycles - from a dangerous bogeyman in the 1980s, to ally from the late 1990s, and ultimately to the default mode of 'supreme leader' and dictator in 2011, capable of inflicting a large scale massacre on fellow Libyans in Benghazi. If Gaddafi was a pantomime villain leader in much of the West and generally unwelcome in many Arab states, public opinion in Sub-Saharan Africa showed a mixture of solidarity and compassion for Gaddafi's Libya.

Notwithstanding Libya's divisive and at times aggressive external posture, including in Africa, this solidarity could be explained by Gaddafi's anti-imperialist rhetoric and pan-Africanist ideals - anchored on petrodollar diplomacy and generosity toward certain African states, Islamic faith-based movements, traditional leaders, liberation movements and political parties, including the African Union. A mélange of policy schizophrenia was therefore evident when South Africa agreed to resolution 1973, but later opposed what it considered NATO overreach.

Though the intervention was NATO-hatted, the leading role played by France and the United Kingdom in convincing a hesitant White House to mobilise NATO and US military assets attest to the displacement of international humanitarian normative interests by specific European security concerns in the immediate European neighborhood. In light of this argument, Gaddafi's death and the change of regime in Tripoli are seen in some African capitals as having been facilitated by 'foreign' European intervention.

The leadership question

2012 will see an ANC leadership contest that the country has already been long anticipating. Business Day, whose editor does not hide his despairing view of Jacob Zuma's unsuitability for the job, has argued that surely the ANC will not re-elect Zuma as President for that would be almost suicidal.

Within the ANC there is endless discussion about having a "leadership debate", though before anyone gets too excited and imagines that we might actually see proper presidential debates US-style, it should quickly be said that such a democratic and transparent prospect would be deeply alarming to the ANC. What is meant is just a discussion about the possible candidates without any participation by them.

Imagine if there was a proper debate and the wrong candidate won! Quel horreur! Moreover, even the discussion of candidates, such as it is, has to be conducted behind closed doors not only with no public participation but with the public not even allowed to hear it. It is a very peculiar way of choosing a leader and, not for the only time, one realises that the way the ANC does it approximates to the way the such things were done by both the Soviet Politburo and by the elders of the tribe choosing a new chief.

This is just how a would-be vanguard party behaves - an anomaly in a democratic polity. In 1991 I was still teaching at Oxford and took back with me from the ANC's July conference of that year which advertised a big post-conference rally. It read: "7 July. Come to King's Park stadium to meet your leaders".

My students were struck by two things. First, the sheer bare-facedness of it: no nonsense about being asked to choose one's leaders. Don't worry, we'll pick 'em for you, your job is just to come along and meet them. Secondly, of course, the lack of any mention of the time - no indication was given for when the meeting would start or stop, it would just meander on through the day.

If 2011 was the year of headlines of despair on South Africa’s poorly functioning public health system, from mismanagement and corruption, to preventable deaths, 2012 needs to be the year of carefully considered health care reform. The key question is this: can the National Health Insurance (NHI) Green Paper, released by the Department of Health in August last year, steer South Africa toward improved quality and access to health care? Careful analysis of the Green Paper conducted by the Helen Suzman Foundation suggests that it will not. The Department of Health thus needs to take this opportunity to begin a dialogue to collaboratively, creatively and openly establish more suitable and strategic health reform policy.

South Africa’s health outcomes have historically been plagued by policy stagnation, a lack of positive and practical action and failure to hold those responsible for preventable deaths and poor management to account. Attempting to implement an inappropriate policy at this stage may well result in further deterioration of a health system which is in dire need of constructive and practical reform.

The Helen Suzman Foundation’s analysis reveals a number of flawed and inappropriate strategy proposals and a lack of clarity as to what is actually being put forward. The following are some of the most concerning issues and proposals contained in the Green Paper.

Firstly, the exact meaning of ‘NHI’ is not clear from the Green Paper. It is not clear if it is a funding mechanism or, rather, a substitute for the entire health system. Such use of the term ‘NHI’ without adequate definition creates meaningless rhetoric and is not useful in policy development. This article thus refers to the ‘Green Paper proposals’ rather than ‘NHI’ as such.

The first half of Mr. Kantor’s article published in the Business Day on 19 January 2012, titled “Why agencies should be calling for more SA debt — not less,” features many welcome and commendable elucidations. From the superfluous nature of the ratings bestowed by the agencies that missed the greatest speculative bubble in history to the obvious problem of government labour regulations hamstringing formal employment and the wonderful reference to the direct causal link between the expansion of the money supply and inflation (often a point not openly espoused). In light of this I shall reserve my response to the concluding paragraphs.

To point: “Raising debt rather than taxes to fund capital formation is surely superior from a rating agency concerned more about the growth outlook than current debt ratios.”

The sticking points in these kinds of exhortations are usually definitional. What does Fitch, and the author, mean by “growth”? Do they mean getting GDP to increase because, if that’s the case, then more government-spending and inflation (money creation) is going to help drive that number up because that’s a primary portion of what that statistic is actually measuring. The icing is already baked into the cake, so to speak.

But prior to this Mr. Kantor explains that “…there can be no prospect of defaults on rand-denominated debt, only of more or less inflation, given the unlimited ability of the government to increase the supply of non-interest-bearing rands.” Thus Mr. Kantor’s position is that the negative consequences of his proposal: the ire of the ratings agencies, inflation and more taxes in future, are off-set by the benefits reaped from government making capital “investments” on behalf of the economy as a whole so “growth” can be spurred.